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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP**  
**INTELLIGENCE REPORT**

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COUNTRY China

DATE:

SUBJECT Operational Difficulties of CNRRA at Mulutao,  
 Manchuria

DIST. 12 November 1946

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PAGES

SUPPLEMENT

The Railway Administration

1. This administration is a source of continuing trouble to the Dairen Supply Office of CNRRA. The railway's local office is at the port of Mulutao, and includes the branch at Mulutao village, three miles away, where some of the trains are marshalled. The director, a Mr. TIEN is obliged to take orders from the Chinchou District Office, but on the other hand, he does not have the authority to refuse the demands of the local military. A civilian organization such as CNRRA has little chance of getting service, even if its needs are made known well in advance. This situation exists because the local military may, at the last moment, requisition for its own use five or ten cars, or even a whole train, previously earmarked for CNRRA use. Under such circumstances, CNRRA DSO is obliged to appeal to higher authority.
2. The Chinchou District Office of the Railway Administration has the authority to allocate cars without interference from the military, but has seldom produced the cars when called upon. When confronted with this fact, the Chinchou Office blames alternately the military and the Mukden office of the Administration. This refusal to accept responsibility adds to the many other difficulties experienced by CNRRA DSO.

The Chinese Military at Mulutao

3. In the early days of 1946, it appeared that CNRRA DSO would be able to carry on successful operations at Mulutao provided close cooperation and liaison were maintained with the Port Command. The situation has now changed to some extent because of the increasing development of Mulutao as a military base. Now stationed at this port are new military units which apparently do not fall directly under the jurisdiction of the Port Command, although the latter still has the highest authority. In the absence of the Port Commander, no one in the Port Command has authority to give instructions or to countermand orders issued by other units of the Chinese Army stationed at Mulutao. The Port Command labor pool is constantly being called upon either to carry out the projects of the Command, or to serve the Chinese Army units. The requests of a civilian organization are, for the most part, ignored. A Chinese member of a civilian organization must depend upon personal contact or friendship with officials in charge, and not upon promised cooperation.

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